Vicious and Virtuous Cycles and the Role of External Non-government Actors in Community Forestry in Oaxaca and Michoacán, Mexico by Barsimantov, James A.
Vicious and Virtuous Cycles and the Role of External
Non-government Actors in Community Forestry in Oaxaca
and Michoacán, Mexico
James A. Barsimantov
Published online: 25 September 2009
# The Author(s) 2009. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract Community forestry offers potential for socio-
economic benefits while maintaining ecosystem services. In
Mexico, government and donor efforts to develop this
sector focus on issues within forest communities. Often
overlooked are effects of external non-government actors
(NGOs and foresters) as links or barriers between commu-
nities and funding, capacity building, and technical support.
To analyze the role of these actors, I analyze household
survey and interview data from 11 communities with
varying levels of vertical integration of forestry production
in states with divergent records of community forestry,
Oaxaca and Michoacán. Results suggest that strong
community governance is necessary but not sufficient for
vertical integration, and strong interactions with non-
government actors are critical. These actors, operating
within the existing framework of government regulations,
have a range of incentives for engaging communities.
Availability of these actors motivated by concern for
community capacity instead of timber income may be a
determinant of community forestry development.
Keywords Communityforestry.Commonproperty.
Mexico.NGO
Introduction
Community forestry in Mexico has been acclaimed as a
global model for sustainable forest resource management
(Bray et al. 2003). Mexico holds the largest number of
communally owned forestry parcels certified by the Forest
Stewardship Council in the world (FSC 2007). In over
25 years of investment, the work of the Mexican govern-
ment, international donors, the World Bank, and NGOs has
led to examples of high levels of community participation
in forest management and the production of value-added
wood products, resulting in economic benefits and mainte-
nance of ecosystem services (Bray et al. 2005).
Yet roughly 500,000 ha are deforested annually in
Mexico, equivalent to a yearly rate of 1.02% for highland
pine/oak/fir forests and 2.06% for tropical forests between
1993 and 2000 (Velazquez et al. 2002). Although much of
this deforestation occurs in forest ecosystems with little
timber value, forests suitable for timber management
continue to suffer from deforestation and degradation
(World Bank 1995;J a r d e l1998, 2006). Community
forestry has become an accepted development model for
rural communities, promising economic benefits for rural
people as well as an alternative to land use change and
forest degradation (Bray et al. 2005). But while a small
percentage of communities continue to improve forest
management practices and produce value-added wood
products, the large majority of community forestry pro-
grams have stagnated. The reason why the social and
environmental successes in exemplar communities are not
reproduced in more community forestry programs is
perhaps the most pressing question in community forest
management in Mexico today, and development workers
usually point to a lack of strong internal organization in
forest communities. Often overlooked, however, is the role
of external non-government actors (NGOs and foresters) in
the development or stagnation of community forestry. As
the main link between forest communities and funding,
capacity building, and technical support, I argue that their
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reinforcing. This leads to what I call virtuous cycles,i n
which certain communities continue to improve with the
help of certain types external actors, and vicious cycles,i n
which community forests degrade under the control of other
types of external actors. I first develop a typology of
external non-government actors which focuses on the
degree to which they are motivated by income from timber
harvesting versus grants from donor agencies for commu-
nity development. I then use a comparative case study of 11
forest communities in Michoacán and Oaxaca using
quantitative and qualitative data to illustrate the importance
of external actors in creating the community forestry
landscape in Mexico.
Forest Governance in Common Property
With over 80% of Mexico’s forests under a common
property regime (Yates 1981), effective local governance of
commonly owned forests is crucial to maintain ecosystem
services and create economic benefits for forest communi-
ties. Collective action theory (Olson 1965) as applied to
common property (Ostrom 1990) aims to understand the
conditions under which groups of people cooperate to
manage commonly owned resources. Effective collective
action in the commons is influenced by three sets of factors:
characteristics of the user group, characteristics of the
resource, and external influences (Ostrom 1990), and
variations in these three sets of factors make it more or
less likely that collective action will ensue. Most research
on management of commonly owned forests has focused on
the first two sets of factors, including extensive work on
rule-making and enforcement, leadership, group size, and
heterogeneity, and characteristics of the resource (Wade
1988; Ostrom 1990; Gibson et al. 2000; Poteete and
Ostrom 2004).
The large and growing body of literature on common
property management rarely focuses on the third set of
factors: external influences on the community. Commons
management invariably takes place within a political
economic context whose influence in some cases may
matter more than internal organization (McCay and Jentoft
1998; Agrawal 2001). According to Ostrom (1990),
external governance can either facilitate the creation and
enforcement of rules or impede local governance by
imposing generalized rules or engaging in corruption. In
Mexico, research on the external context of community
forestry has focused on failures in management resulting
from the lack of coordination between state and local
authorities in the Monarch Butterfly Reserve in Michoacán
(Tucker 2004); on a local logging ban that created
disincentives for sustainable timber management in the
Lake Pátzcuaro basin in Michoacán (Klooster 2003); and
on federal reforms of land tenure and forestry laws in
Durango and Quintana Roo (Taylor and Zabin 2000; Taylor
2000, 2003).
Yet there is gap in research on the role of non-
government actors in community forestry, in Mexico and
in general. Political mediators can both gain access to
resources and power as well as perpetuate state domination
in communities in Mexico (de la Peña 1992; de Vries
2002). However, this lens is seldom applied to a common
property analysis of resource management. Bray (2000) and
Vargas-Prieto (1998) point out the positive role of ejido
unions in forming community forestry programs in Quin-
tana Roo, Mexico, but do not explore cases in which
external actors may stymie community development. The
lack of extensive research on this topic is surprising given
that nearly every community with a forestry program relies
on the services of an external non-government actor. As
interdisciplinary environmental science attempts to bridge
the gap between research and practice, the topic of this
paper is of special pertinence to understand how develop-
ment efforts affect commons management.
Non-government actors form a key link between
beneficiaries of development assistance (communities) and
donors (Ostrom et al. 2002). They can form a link between
the state and the communities so that opposing forces in the
government can be muted and new policies can be put into
practice (Vargas-Prieto 1998). In the commercialization of
non-timber forest products, the importance of non-
government actors was identified in almost every stage of
collecting and marketing resources (Marshall et al. 2003).
Yet non-government actors are often given responsibility
for development by the central government without first
determining their capacity to do so (Haley and Clayton
2003), and some non-government actors may siphon off
development funds that are meant for beneficiaries (Meyer
1995). Thus, the influence of non-government actors can
either be positive or negative, and this study aims to both
provide evidence of the key points at which non-
government actors play a role and identify the incentives
that lead to vicious and virtuous cycles.
Community Forestry in Mexico
Community forestry in Mexico began in the late 1970s
when concessions to parastatal timber companies were
nearing expiration and a handful of communities in Oaxaca
and Durango organized to attain the right to harvest timber
from land under their control (ASETECO 2002; Bray and
Merino 2004). The Forestry Law of 1986 established
community forestry in Mexico by canceling concessions
and formally recognizing the rights of communities to
manage forest resources and contract forestry services
(Merino 2004). Most of Mexico’s highly successful
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Velazquez et al. 2003; Bray et al. 2004) were initiated in
the late 1970s and early 1980s as a result of the grassroots
community forestry movement and subsequent government
sponsored community forestry development programs.
Since the end of this initial period of growth, community
forestry in Mexico has grown in two directions. First,
communities that had created stable programs in the 1980s
continued to grow and expand, training local foresters,
strengthening community governance institutions, acquir-
ing infrastructure, and even attaining FSC certification.
Second, more communities have attained permits for forest
management; currently there are nearly 2,000 active permits
in Mexico’s commonly owned forests (Antinori et al.
2004).
Mexico’s forestry programs vary immensely in the level
of participation in local forest governance, the ecological
sustainability of forest management, and the type of wood
products created. The National Forestry Commission
(CONAFOR) classifies forestry communities based on their
level of vertical integration in the productive chain of wood
processing. This system includes four types of communi-
ties: (1) communities with harvestable timber volume but
no active forest management plan, (2) communities that
charge a stumpage fee to timber companies who implement
forest management, (3) communities that fell timber and
transport logs to sell to an external saw mill, and (4)
communities that own a saw mill and produce sawn lumber
or finished wood products. Only about 14% of the 2,000
active permits in Mexico are Type 4 forestry programs,
1
and most of these are communities that had initiated stable
programs in the early 1980s (Ramirez 2005, personal
communication). While the level of vertical integration is
not in itself a criterion to determine success in forest
management, higher levels of vertical integration usually
reflect stable organization, high levels of community
participation, community control of forest resources, exis-
tence of sound financial management structures, and more
careful ecological practices, all of which are criteria often
used to measure success in community forestry (Pagdee et
al. 2006). In addition, nearly all communities with FSC
certification are Type 4, which reflects both social and
ecological sustainability criteria. The large majority of
communities with forestry permits in Mexico, however,
are Type 2 communities that participate in few forest
management activities, instead contracting to timber
companies and private foresters, which may raise ques-
tions about the social and ecological outcomes of these
programs.
Community Forestry in Oaxaca and Michoacán
The states of Michoacán and Oaxaca both contain large
volumes of pine species, the dominant species harvested for
timber in Mexico, ranking fourth and sixth in total forest
volume nationwide (SEMARNAT 2004). Oaxaca, especial-
ly the Sierra Juarez region, is perhaps the most widely
renowned region in the country for communities that
produce sawn wood and finished wood products (Type 4
communities) and that have attained FSC Certification
(Table 1). Michoacán, on the other hand, has a high
percentage of communities that contract timber harvesting
services to local timber companies (Type 2 communities),
leaving most of forest management to private foresters. In
addition, illegal logging is widespread throughout Michoa-
cán, accounting for roughly half of timber harvested
(Pimentel Ramirez 2005), and is less prevalent in Oaxaca
(Galeote 2006).
Achievements of the government-run community forest-
ry development program, the Program for Communities and
Forest Management (PROCYMAF), have also not been
equivalent in the two states. From 2004 to 2006, Type 4
communities increased 16% (from 37 to 43) in Oaxaca and
only 1% in Michoacán (from 20 to 21 communities). Type
3 communities increased 31% (from 42 to 55) in Oaxaca
and decreased 2% (from 15 to 12) in Michoacán. Finally, in
both states Type 2 communities increased about 10%
(Rodriguez Salazar 2006, unpublished manuscript), sug-
gesting that acquiring a forest management permit is not as
difficult as appropriating forest management activities. In
other words, forest communities in Oaxaca continue to
realize greater capacity while those in Michoacán remain
relatively stagnant.
A complex set of interrelated historical, geographical,
cultural and political factors may explain why Oaxaca has a
more advanced forestry sector and why Michoacán has
higher levels of illegal logging. Forested regions of
Michoacán were settled by the Spanish in the colonial
period and subsequently more haciendas were established
there than in Oaxaca (Altman and Lockhart 1976; Chance
1989). This was perhaps due to Michoacán’s relatively
flatter terrain that allowed for more accessible settlement
and agriculture. As a result, traditional indigenous gover-
nance systems may have been more disrupted in Michoacán.
In addition, timber concessions from the late 1950s to the
early 1980s in Oaxaca have played a role in educating locals
on forest management practices (Antinori 2000), and
logging bans in Michoacán during the same time period
may have created an incentive for illegal extraction. Illegal
logging in Michoacán may be attributed to a more
1 Data compiled from the National Survey of Community-Managed
Forestry in Mexico (Phase 1). Principal Investigators: Camille M.
Antinori, Juan Manuel Torres-Rojo, Octavio Magaña, David B. Bray,
2006.
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capacity necessary to process the legal timber volume
(Pimentel Ramirez 2005), greater availability of capital in a
relatively wealthier state, a more developed road network,
proximity to markets in Mexico City, and, as a result of
increased opportunity for resource extraction, corruption
among foresters and government officials (Navia Antezana
2006). The problem, however, is overdetermined; none of
these reasons alone can explain observed differences in the
development of community forestry and illegal logging in
the two states, and all of these reasons probably contribute.
These historical reasons together can explain why
Oaxaca and Michoacán entered the era of community
forestry in the early 1980s in different situations. However,
government and non-government interviewees suggested
that Oaxaca communities have higher levels of vertical
integration than those in Michoacán because they have
stronger internal governance structures (Ramirez 2005,
personal communication). The historical reasons mentioned
above are thought to have an effect on internal community
governance, when in fact, as I will demonstrate, these
historical reasons also created very different landscapes of
external non-government actors in each state. Due to
differing histories of extractive practices in Michoacán
and Oaxaca, variations of the forest policy framework
evolved in each state, and this in turn has reinforced the
types of activities in which external non-government actors
engage.
Analytical Framework: A Typology of External
Non-government Actors
In most communities, every step of community forestry is
negotiated with the help of an external non-government
actor. In fact, not a single community forestry program was
initiated without the aid of these actors, and only a few
have gained sufficient capacity to become independent of
external support. Mexico’s Type 4 ‘success stories’ required
extensive external assistance, the most important compo-
nents of which were capacity building and community
organizing, rather than monetary assistance or technical
services (Chapela Mendoza 1999; ASETECO 2002). Thus,
the availability and quality of external actors that promote
these components may be a key factor in determining the
outcomes of community forestry.
The roles of external non-government actors in commu-
nity forestry fall into two categories: community develop-
ment and timber extraction. Community development
activities are focused on the community, its leaders and its
assembly, and involve capacity building in forest manage-
ment, accountability with community funds, rule-making
and enforcement, and soliciting funds from government
programs or international donors. Timber extraction activ-
ities, on the other hand, are directed at the forest, rather than
the community, even though permission from the commu-
nity is required. These activities involve writing manage-
ment plans, demarcating trees for felling, and navigating
government bureaucracy. In communities with low partic-
ipation in forest management, these activities may occur
with little community oversight. External non-government
actors can either be a catalyst for the growth of a forestry
program and better management practices or a bottleneck
that prevents its development and contributes to degrada-
tion. Much of this depends on the motivations of the non-
government actor; whether the external actor is more
interested in community development activities or timber
extraction activities.
At one end of the spectrum of non-government actors are
traditional private foresters who are trained in timber
extraction activities and are paid a fee per cubic meter of
timber demarcated for felling. Thus, it is in the interests of
foresters to demarcate trees for felling that will provide the
most and best quality wood, and greater community
capacity for forest management does not lead to greater
profit for the forester. At the other end of the spectrum are
non-government organizations (NGOs) that focus on
community development. Aside from altruism for the
environment and rural people, which is arguably a strong
motivation of these actors, they are motivated to implement
Table 1 Number and percent of communities by level of vertical integration in Oaxaca and Michoacán and in study regions
Forestry
type
Oaxaca Michoacán
Statewide Study region: the Sierra Juarez (Districts of Ixtlán,
Etla, and Villa Alta)
Statewide Study region: municipalities of Ario de Rosales,
Salvador Escalante and Tacámbaro
2 74 (50%) 13 (35%) 138 (80%) 18 (78%)
3 42 (28%) 11 (30%) 24 (14%) 4 (17%)
4 32 (22%) 13 (35%) 11 (6%) 1 (4%)
Total 148 (100%) 37 (100%) 173 (100%) 23 (100%)
National Survey of Community-Managed Forestry in Mexico (phase 1), ibid. Reliable data for type 1 communities were not available
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tangible outcomes in communities lead to more and larger
grants from donors. Unsuccessful projects may lead to the
inability to attain funds for similar projects.
Between these two extremes are various types of hybrid
external actors. Some private foresters have gained experi-
ence in community development work, either through work
in government programs or research institutions. Some
NGOs employ foresters or contract forestry work to trusted
private foresters, and thus also perform timber extraction
activities. These hybrid organizations have varying degrees
of both motivations depending on the composition of their
staff and the types of projects they take on. Finally, some
Type 4 communities have become nearly independent of
external non-government actors, forming their own staff
that carries out timber extraction activities and contracts
with NGOs for some community development activities. In
all cases encountered, this internal staff is paid a salary by
the community which is not dependent on the amount of
timber harvested. This phenomenon can be seen as the
outcome of extensive community development activities on
the part of external non-government actors. Figure 1 shows
a continuum of motivations of external non-government
actors.
2 I will hereafter refer to the types of external actors
as TEO (timber extraction oriented) actors, CDO (commu-
nity development oriented) actors, and hybrid actors.
I argue that (1) strong internal governance is necessary
but not sufficient for community appropriation of forest
management; external non-government actors play a key
role, and (2) the actions of external non-government actors
on community forestry development can be understood
through their motivations for engaging in their activities.
Research Design and Methodology
I selected case study communities from a representative
region of Michoacán and the most highly vertically
integrated forestry region in Oaxaca because I aim to
understand why some communities attain higher levels of
vertical integration than others and whether this situation is
related to state-level differences. In Oaxaca I selected case
study communities from the Sierra Juarez, composed of the
districts of Ixtlán, Etla, and Villa Alta, because it is above
the state average in its percent of Type 4 communities (see
Table 1). In Michoacán, I selected communities from the
Central Highlands municipalities of Ario de Rosales and
Salvador Escalate. Michoacán contains three general
regions where extensive forest management occurs: the
Central Highlands, Eastern Michoacán, and the Coast
Range. I selected communities from the Central Highlands
because (1) it suffers from the same issues of illegal logging
and poor management as other regions in the state
(Pimentel Ramirez 2005), (2) it is not distant from
population centers like the remote Coast Range and (3) it
does not have the unique and problematic relationships
between external institutions and communities that resulted
from the creation of the Monarch Butterfly Reserve in
Eastern Michoacán (Tucker 2004). Within the Central
Highlands, I selected a non-indigenous region because the
Meseta Purepecha within the Central Highlands is the only
indigenous region of the state and is therefore not
representative of ethnicity in the state.
In each region, I selected communities that varied in
their level of vertical integration and attempted to control
for exogenous factors that may influence the success of a
forest management program, including population, forest
area, and topography (Table 2, Fig. 1). While population
and area vary between communities, this variation is not
skewed towards one type of community or one state. A
topographic roughness measure indicates that Oaxaca
communities are steeper than those in Michoacán, but
within each state the topography of communities is
comparable. To control for forest type and distance to
population centers, each community shares a boundary with
at least one other case study community.
Within each region, I selected communities to reflect
the distribution of vertical integration of each state,
selecting additional Type 1 and 2 communities in
Michoacán for a total of seven communities and
selecting one of each category in Oaxaca for a total of
four communities (Table 1). While Type 4 communities
exist in Michoacán, they are scarce and none were found
in the case study region. Even though choosing a non-
indigenous area in the Central Highlands made it impos-
sible to select a Type 4 community in Michoacán, the
benefits of representativeness that the region provided,
along with the fact that my selection strategy aimed to
reflect the actual distribution of vertical integration types
in the state, outweighed the costs of a less balanced
research design (Fig. 2).
A household survey was applied in a 20% random
sample of households in each community (n=382). A
random sample was taken from a list all households in the
community that was either available through the commu-
nity authorities or created with their help. Questions were
developed with the aid of a local NGO and were pre-
tested in the first community visited in eight households.
Surveys were administered orally by three research
assistants from Mexican universities, and in each commu-
nity a local resident was hired to locate selected houses
2 Another category of external actors, second-level institutions or
community/ejido unions, can be either hybrid actors or internal
organizations depending on whether communities run the union or
are subject to outsider decisions.
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holds. Surveys required between 40 min and 1 h to
complete and response rates were between 90% and 100%
in each community. The survey contained questions
pertaining to the entire household as well as specifically
to the head of the household and was organized into five
sections: (1) household demographics, (2) employment
and income sources, (3) agricultural production, (4)
community participation, and (5) use of commonly-
owned natural resources. Data were entered into an excel
spreadsheet by research assistants, and analysis was
conducted with the SAS statistical package.
In addition, in each community I conducted between
eight and 12 open-ended interviews with local authorities,
locals with knowledge of forest use and management, and
older community members with knowledge of community
history, as well as 44 interviews with government officials
(23 interviews), NGO staff (seven), private foresters (ten),
and timber companies (four). I used a snowball sampling
technique starting with local authorities and government
officials. For each community interview I selected from a
list of potential questions, depending on the knowledge
that I found each interviewee to possess, including
questions on forest use history, communal governance,
employment patterns, infrastructure and social services,
use of income from timber harvests, opinions of external
non-government actors, capacity building for forest
management, and participation in development projects.
Questions for external actor interviews pertained to
individuals’ knowledge of case study communities,
interactions in general with forest communities, the
forestry sector in the state, illegal logging activities, and
the success of government sponsored development pro-
grams. All interviews were recorded on a digital voice
recorder except for two respondents who asked not to be
recorded, and recordings were analyzed qualitatively to
understand causal mechanisms of relationships found in
quantitative analysis.
Fig. 1 The spectrum of external non-government actors
Table 2 Characteristics of case study communities
Forestry
type
Total surface
area (ha)
a
Forested surface
area (ha)
a
Annual permitted
volume (m
3)
a
Total population
b Topographic
roughness
c
Michoacán
El Oyamel 3 679 634 5,612 337 1.029
Las Lomas 2 1,116 597 970 794 1.015
San Juan 2 971 2,006 2,100 748 1.027
La Capilla 2 2,144 1,619 3,849 633 1.031
El Cajoncito 1 946 140 No permit 537 1.030
Las Palmas 1 3,328 1,106 No permit 710 1.033
San Gustavo 1 1,623 156 No permit 1,021 1.009
Oaxaca
Palo Verde 4 1,269 850 3,197 724 1.080
Buenos Aires 3 2,219 1,433 2,599 280 1.120
Picachos 2 5,690 4,646 9,024 292 1.069
El Rincon 1 6,364 5,278 No permit 789 1.187
Community names have been changed to pseudonyms to maintain anonymity of respondents
aData obtained from the Secretariat of the Environment (SEMARNAT) in each state
bData obtained from 2005 Population Count (INEGI)
cThis is a measure of rugosity created using digital elevation models and ArcView plugin Benthic Terrain Modeler. Rugosity, as defined here, is
the mean of each cell’s ratio between the surface area and planar area in the region of interest. Values from 1 to 5 are given to each cell, from 1 =
flat to 5 = steep. For more information see (http://www.csc.noaa.gov/products/btm/)
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If the level of vertical integration (type) of forestry
programs and its associated outcomes are related only to
the strength of internal organization of a community, there
should be a clear relationship between survey questions
measuring strength of organization and forestry type. This
should hold true across both case study states because this
pattern would not be dependent on factors external to the
community. However, survey analysis results on questions
that measure internal organization—management of funds,
trust in leadership, and participation—show that this pattern
exists in Michoacán case study communities but not in
Oaxaca (Table 3). In Michoacán, heads of households in
higher forestry type communities responded with signifi-
cantly higher values on these variables. In Oaxaca,
however, internal organization across all communities was
universally strong, even in communities with low forestry
types. These findings were similar for three other questions
not included in Table 3 on community governance:
attendance at community assemblies, reporting rule-
breakers, and trust in other community members. While
these six questions are not a complete measure of
community governance, these findings suggest that strong
internal organization is necessary but not sufficient for
achieving a higher forestry type.
A survey question that measured heads of household’s
trust in their forester showed a markedly different pattern. I
use this question as a proxy for the strength of interaction
with the forester, including the forester’s focus on commu-
nity development and the community’s ability to attract and
work with a trustworthy forester. A high level of trust in the
Fig. 2 Location of study states,
study regions, and case study
communities
Table 3 Internal organization: results of factorial ANOVA by forestry type and state
Forestry type Statement 1: communal funds are
managed well and for the benefit of the
community
Statement 2: community leaders are
working well for the advancement of the
community
Statement 3: my opinion is considered
during community assemblies
Michoacán Oaxaca Michoacán Oaxaca Michoacán Oaxaca
1 2.8 (0.14) [a] 4.3 (0.22) [c] 2.3 (0.14) [a] 4.3 (0.24) [b, c] 2.7 (0.13) [a] 4.7 (0.14) [d]
2 3.1 (0.23) [a, b] 4.3 (0.21) [c] 2.4 (0.19) [a] 4.3 (0.17) [b, c] 3.0 (0.17) [a, b] 4.6 (0.16) [c, d]
3 4.1 (0.22) [b, c] 4.5 (0.21) [c] 3.8 (0.29) [b] 4.7 (0.12) [c] 3.8 (0.25) [b, c] 4.4 (0.22) [c, d]
4 4.6 (0.10) [c] 4.6 (0.15) [b, c] 4.7 (0.12) [d]
Type main effect p<0.01 p<0.001 Not significant
State main effect p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001
Respondents were asked the extent to which they agreed to statements on a Likert-scale of 1 (total disagreement) to 5 (total agreement). Standard
errors are in parentheses next to means in table. Letters below means signify different groups of means, significant at the 0.05 level
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capacity in forest management and that members can
adequately monitor the forester’s activities, trusting that
management is proceeding according to regulations. On the
contrary, a lack of trust in the forester may signify that
heads of households are not aware of details of timber
extraction activities and/or that they suspect the forester is
cheating them. Both of these scenarios suggest weak
interactions between the community members and the
forester as well as low levels of involvement by the forester
in community development activities.
Results show a clear relationship between communities
with higher forestry types and trust in the forester,
suggesting that communities may not be able to attain
higher forestry types without positive interactions with
external actors (Table 4). In addition, there is little
difference between mean values in Michoacán and Oaxaca,
unlike in the results of internal organization questions. Thus
the manner in which foresters and community members
interact in the two states may be similar.
Finally, using a composite variable of the six community
governance questions (created using a simple average) and
the trust in the forester variable, I conducted two separate
linear regressions using a suite of independent variables
that focused on education, ethnicity, income sources and
natural resource consumption to analyze whether individual
socioeconomic variables influence respondents’ views
about community governance or trust in foresters (Table 5).
Results show some similar patterns for the two dependent
variables: higher education levels, more subsistence pro-
duction, fewer hectares owned (for governance) and less
corn sold (for trust in foresters) are related to more positive
perceptions of community governance and foresters. The
one surprising result is that, while ethnicity is significant in
both regressions, the sign changes. Individuals who speak
an indigenous language are more likely to have positive
perceptions of community governance and are also less
likely to trust their forester. This may mean that strong
relationships between indigenous people and foresters are
more difficult to forge even though indigenous people seem
to have more positive attitudes about governance within the
community.
These results begin to refute the notion that the level of
vertical integration is related only to the strength of internal
organization. First, strong internal governance is not always
related to higher forestry types, which suggests that higher
forestry types require something in addition to strong
internal governance. Second, trust in the forester is
significantly related to forestry type, suggesting the
forester’s potential role as a gatekeeper of community
appropriation of forest management activities by providing
capacity building for forest management, a topic that will
be explored in the following section. Third, indigenous
ethnicity is an important factor in determining lack of trust
in foresters, implying that this barrier to trust must be
overcome for higher levels of vertical integration to be
achieved. Given that trust in foresters by level of vertical
integration does not differ by state and yet Oaxaca has far
more vertically integrated communities, I conclude that
differences in the pools of external actors in the two states
may contribute to Oaxaca’s high level of community
forestry development, rather than a difference in the quality
of interactions between communities and foresters. While
perhaps not perfectly conclusive on their own, these
quantitative results set the stage for the qualitative analysis
that follows.
Analyzing the Relationship Between Communities
and External Non-government Actors
3
Oaxaca—Palo Verde (Type 4)
Community Forestry History Palo Verde is one of the best
known forestry communities in Mexico. It possess log
trucks, a skidder, a saw mill, a wood drying kiln and a
dozen small-scale carpentry shops, is the only study
community that has attained FSC certification, and by all
accounts is a model of forest management and community
governance. Locals claim that out-migration has been
reduced to nearly zero as a result of jobs created by the
forestry program, the saw mill, and the carpentry shops.
Interactions with Non-government Actors Tracing the re-
cent history of Palo Verde since the early 1980s shows the
continued influence of external non-government actors who
were interested in community development. In the early
1980s the community joined the Organization for the
Defense of Natural Resources of the Sierra Juarez (ODRE-
Table 4 Relationship with forester: results of factorial ANOVA by
forestry type and state
Statement 4: I trust the forester that works in the community
Forestry type Michoacán Oaxaca
2 3.0 (0.22) [a] 2.8 (0.30) [a]
3 4.2 (0.18) [b] 4.4 (0.18) [b]
4 4.5 (1.9) [b]
Forestry type main effect p<0.001
State main effect Not significant
3 Due to space limitations, not all case study communities are
discussed. Instead, key relationships are highlighted in certain
communities.
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communities that pressured the federal government to grant
control of forest resources to communities. ODRENASIJ
was created by forest communities and requested the
support of student activists from Mexico City. This is how
the two-decade relationship between Palo Verde and a core
group of outsiders began. After winning the struggle
against the concessions, the activists helped the community
obtain funding from the Rockefeller Foundation and
provided technical assistance that focused on capacity
building, community organizing, and participatory plan-
ning. Eventually the activists formed several NGOs that
have become leaders in the country in participatory rural
development, based primarily on their experiences with
Palo Verde and nearby communities (Chapela and Lara
1996; Chapela Mendoza 1999). As local capacity grew, the
community formed a union with three other communities
in the region and took on complete responsibility for
timber extraction activities. In the meantime, the NGO
took on a peripheral role by helping to develop new
projects and obtaining international funding. An indication
of the importance of these external actors in forming local
forest governance is that Palo Verde had no internal rules
for forest use prior to the beginning of community
f o r e s t r y .A c c o r d i n gt oa no l d e rc o m m u n i t ym e m b e r ,
roughly 25 years ago many locals made a living by
cutting wood shingles for home construction with no
limits on how much they could cut and no rules for
requesting permission from local authorities, all of which
exist today. These rules are now enforced by the
community but required the help of external actors
dedicated to community development activities to create
them. As a forester and community member of a
neighboring community said, “We always saw it was
necessary to have the community, foresters, and an NGO
that would guide the process.”
Oaxaca—Santa Maria Picachos (Type 2)
Community Forestry History Santa Maria Picachos, a 30
min drive from Palo Verde, is a Type 2 community and
contracts all forestry activities with timber companies.
Its forests were logged by the same parastatal timber
company that worked in Palo Verde. However, they did
not join the ODRENASIJ in the early 1980s, perhaps
because the community is located slightly farther away
than Palo Verde from most member communities. Even
after state-sponsored timber concessions ended, the
parastatal timber company continued to harvest timber
in Picachos through a direct agreement with the
community. Eventually the parastatal timber company
left the region and was replaced by smaller timber
companies. Community members I spoke with have
little recollection of exactly which timber company
harvested in which years. This lack of knowledge seems
indicative of the general removal of community mem-
bers from forestry activities. Yet despite low capacity in
forest management, the community owns and operates a
bus line to Oaxaca City, a type of community business
that does not exist in any Type 2 case study
communities in Michoacán. Thus, one must question
Table 5 Regression results: are individual characteristics related to perceptions of governance and trust in foresters?
Variable Community governance composite Trust in forester
Age 0.00 (0.00) 0.01 (0.01)
Education level 0.27*** (0.06) 0.43** (0.17)
Indigenous language speaker 0.31*** (0.11) −0.86*** (0.27)
Anyone in household living outside the municipality? 0.07 (0.10) 0.35 (0.30)
Agriculture is primary occupation 0.04 (0.10) 0.11 (0.27)
Hectares of individual usufruct land −0.03** (0.01) 0.00 (0.04)
Hectares of corn planted −0.01 (0.03) −0.03 (0.08)
% of corn sold −0.30 (0.22) −1.43** (0.70)
% of food from subsistence 0.12*** (0.04) 0.28*** (0.10)
Owns refrigerator −0.10 (0.11) 0.09 (0.28)
% domestic use timber from communal forest −0.03 (0.03) 0.00 (0.09)
Use gas or firewood to cook? −0.05 (0.07) 0.04 (0.18)
Constant 3.30*** (0.39) 1.52 (0.95)
R square adj 0.30 0.12
Observations (or sum wgts) 261 141
F ratio 10.48*** 2.56***
Hum Ecol (2010) 38:49–63 57why existing community capacity has not been applied
to forest management.
Interactions with Non-government Actors For the past
10 years, Picachos has used the services of a private
forester from Oaxaca City. According to several govern-
ment officials, the forester working in Picachos is one of
the least respected foresters in the state because attention is
given to maximizing timber harvest and little or no effort is
made for capacity building. According to one community
member,
The forester doesn’t tell us that there are programs.
He’s pegged to the timber company. Only when the
president of the community went himself to see did
we find out....We wanted to get a mini-saw mill but
we didn’t know how to do it....There’s no one that
knows here....We haven’t fought with him because we
don’t want problems. (Community member, Santa
Maria Picachos)
Picachos’ forester has never provided trainings or
applied for a development subsidy on behalf of the
community or, according to government records, for any
of the communities in which he works. When one
timber company terminates work in the community, the
forester, rather than the community, finds another, which
places more control in the hands of the forester. Several
community members noted that in timber harvest areas
only pine trees are harvested and oaks, which have little
market value, are left behind. Most forests in Mexico
are managed under a selection strategy in which trees of
all species are removed based on their existing distri-
bution in order to maintain diversity and timber value.
Harvesting only pine trees can lead to low regeneration
because they are shade intolerant and heavy shade from
oaks and other broadleaved species does not allow
regeneration (Musalem 1972; Snook 1986), and locals’
anecdotal reports of changes in forest composition confirm
this pattern. Thus, the lack of an external actor interested
in promoting community involvement may be leading to
forest degradation and limited economic benefits for
community members.
Oaxaca—El Rincon (Type 1)
Community Forestry History The community of El Rincon,
a 45 min drive from both Palo Verde and Picachos, has no
forestry permit. According to survey results, they also have
a higher percentage of indigenous language speakers, and
the community is also slightly farther from Oaxaca City
than the other communities. They have had intermittent
harvesting of a section of forest that burned in forest fires in
1998 and 2001, although this is not a formal timber
management plan.
Interactions with Non-government Actors The reputation of
the timber company that has harvested the burnt areas in El
Rincon is even worse than that of Picachos’ forester. Locals
mentioned that the owner brings different foresters each
visit and no efforts are made in community development
activities. Locals complain that trees unaffected by forest
fires are often felled. A community member quoted the
timber company owner as saying, “Do you want your
potatoes? Well then let’s cut that one too.” The community
is paid roughly 70% of the price per cubic meter that other
communities in the region attain, but they were unaware of
this discrepancy. On the other hand, El Rincon’s internal
governance in other matters seems quite strong. The most
striking example is the community’s sewage system, which
is the most advanced of any of the 11 case study
communities. Community members, under the guidance of
government health officials, collected funds from residents
to build a sewer and filtration system, and required each
family to buy a toilet. Thus, El Rincon has the capacity to
organize as well as the ability to adapt local rules to the
suggestions of external actors. Strong internal organization
may be necessary for these projects, but it is not sufficient;
external actors are also critical.
Michoacán—El Oyamel (Type 3)
Of the four communities with a forestry program in
Michoacán, three have the same forester. According to
several government officials, NGOs, and foresters, the
forester that works for these three communities is not
trustworthy. How did El Oyamel, a Type 3 community,
manage to attain a higher level of vertical integration, and
why do they continue to work with and trust this forester?
Community Forestry History El Oyamel began its forestry
program in the mid-1980s, in the same period that other
Mexican success stories organized to manage common
forests. It is a relatively new community, formed in 1978,
and its founders petitioned the federal government for land
with the intention of using it for forestry. The community’s
initial desire for community forestry seems key to the
advances it has made. Indeed, El Oyamel has a level of
internal organization comparable to Oaxaca communities
according to survey results.
Interactions with Non-Government Actors While private
foresters have worked continuously with the community, El
Oyamel has also had extensive support from government
agencies and NGOs. Today, two NGOs work with El
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wood theft and another on a nursery to produce saplings for
reforestation using locally harvested seeds. Through these
experiences and others, the community has learned enough
about forest management to monitor their forester and thus
trust his work. According to one community member:
I saw that the marking [of trees for felling] wasn’t
going well, it was illegal. [He] was marking all the
straightest and biggest trees, and leaving the ones
with a lot of branches and bad ones. And parts [of the
cutting area] were cut too thinly. I told him that it
shouldn’t be like that... that’s when we agreed in our
[biweekly] meeting that we need to invite that forester
to sit him down and tell him that it shouldn’t be like
that. That’s when he said that [the timber buyer] was
obligating him. We said, ‘No, you can’t be obligated
by anybody else. You work out your relations with
other people and don’t take things away from us.
Because if not we’ll fire you and get another forester.’
He said, ‘No, no, I’ll mark well, I’ll take of you.’ He
denied it, but we knew it was happening, and now it’s
better, it’s normal. (Community member, El Oyamel)
Michoacán—La Capilla (Type 2)
Community Forestry History La Capilla, a Type 2 com-
munity, has been managing its forest with limited
participation by community members for nearly 20 years.
Community members rarely go to the forest, have no
vigilance program, and merely await payment following
the timber harvest. During one visit to the community,
the president of the community called a meeting in order
to present my research program to the community.
According to other community members, it was the first
community meeting in over a year and only one third of
members attended.
Interactions with Non-government Actors Following this
meeting, the president began collecting signatures on a
typed sheet of paper which had been composed by their
forester, who is the same one that works in El Oyamel. The
paper claimed that two weeks prior there had been a
meeting with the majority of community members in
attendance during which the forester presented a project to
obtain a government subsidy for the forestry program. In
fact there had been no meeting and community members
did not know the intent of the subsidy that the forester was
soliciting on their behalf. This had occurred in two prior
years and the community had given signatures, but never
saw subsidy money enter the community. The commonality
of this practice was confirmed by an NGO worker with
several years of experience soliciting government funds on
behalf of communities.
In some communities there is interest from the
community and they asked for you as a consultant.
In other cases, they give their signatures because they
know they are going to get something, not knowing
what it is going to be. There is no intent to organize
so that the investment will continue. There is no one
with commitment to do follow-up. [The external
actor] is committed because he is paid [a percentage
of the grant]. (NGO worker in Michoacán)
Michoacán—Las Lomas (Type 2)
Interactions with External Actors A final example in
Michoacán shows how CDO actors can aid in the
process of capacity building while simultaneously
teaching the community to be vigilant of the activities
of foresters. The community of Las Lomas initiated its
forest management program in 2002 with the help of a
local NGO, the Grupo Interdisciplinario de Technología
Rural Apropiada (GIRA). GIRA’s role was to organize
the creation of a community land use plan, which
involved demarcating all communal forest lands and
individual agricultural plots with GPS units, facilitating
group decisions on management of communal lands,
and designing rules to monitor and enforce these
decisions. Ongoing work with GIRA has focused on
training community members in forest management
activities, including felling timber, monitoring bark
beetle infestation, and measuring the quantity of lumber
felled. During the period that the community worked
with GIRA, the community fired two foresters, one of
whom manages the forests of El Oyamel and La
Capilla. On both occasions, community members did
not trust that the forester was managing timber
extraction fairly and sustainably. Without the knowledge
that GIRA provided to the community, they may not
have had the awareness to take these actions, under-
scoring the importance of CDO actors. Staff at GIRA
suggest that it may be impossible to trust any forester in
the state, and they therefore advocate community
monitoring of the foresters’ activities.
The Landscape of External Actors in Michoacán
and Oaxaca
Case study communities in Michoacán have both a lack of
strong internal organization and a lack of external non-
government actors motivated to conduct community devel-
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nals in Michoacán is that private foresters continue to
dominate the process of forest management.
The communities never have been able to appropriate
their resources. It’s difficult for them to apply for
funds, to sell [their timber on their own]. They don’t
have a culture of commercialization or organization.
So [a private forester] represents the community. They
have the community threatened. ‘If you contract with
other [foresters], then I’m not going to buy your
wood.’ When in reality they could sell their wood at a
better price elsewhere. (Government worker in
Michoacán)
The landscape of foresters in Oaxaca, while perhaps
better than that of Michoacán, has many of the same
characteristics. In Michoacán, one NGO worker com-
mented that, of the private foresters in the states, “none
have commitment to the community,” and in Oaxaca an
NGO worker said that finding committed foresters is “like
searching for a needle in a haystack.” The difference in
Oaxaca is that
[Private foresters] have lost presence and political
control because the situation of forests in Mexico is a
disaster and they have never created a solution that
wasn’t corruption.... [In Oaxaca, NGO workers with
training as] geographers, biologists, anthropologists,
sociologists have been able to enter in this new
scenario and suggest more social strategies. But this
control in Michoacán hasn’t permitted it. (NGO
worker in Oaxaca)
In Oaxaca, interviewees also lauded hybrid organizations
composed of foresters and community development pro-
fessionals. “The creation of these technical service
groups....have made a cut in the vertical control that private
foresters have had in the past in the country.... These have
been rehearsed here and have been used as a platform in
other states for forest management on a more community
level” (NGO worker, Oaxaca). While the distinction
between the two states is clear, it is important to note that
the situation is not black or white; the range of external
non-government actors exists in both states.
Vicious and Virtuous Cycles—The Bottleneck
of External Non-government Actors
I have shown that external non-government actors influence
the formation of community capacity for forest manage-
ment and that the pool of these actors in Oaxaca offers
more prospects for community development than that of
Michoacán. How does the interaction between communities
and external non-government actors create self-reinforcing
development in some cases and self-reinforcing stagnation
in others?
Incentives and Motivations
As mentioned above, timber extraction oriented (TEO)
actors are motivated to maximize timber harvests. A
community development oriented (CDO) actor in Oaxaca
made the following comment about his arrival to forestry
school in the late 1970s: “A student [from the forestry
school] asked me why I came here to study. I said because I
like the forests... [He said,] ‘No, we come here come
because we want to make money. We are interested in the
forest to make money.’” Although a TEO actor is officially
employed by the community and paid through timber sales,
the timber company often pays the TEO actor directly,
subtracting this payment from the total value of timber
bought from the community. In effect then, the TEO actor
is employed by the timber company. The timber company is
interested in obtaining the most wood of the best quality,
rather than removing damaged or crooked trees to improve
the genetic stock of the forest. Thus the interests of TEO
actors and timber companies are similar, and the incentive
for the forester to mismanage the forest is evident. The
community, the owners of the resource, is the only actor
that may have a long-term interest in the quality of the
forest, but without management knowledge and organiza-
tion for monitoring, it is likely that mismanagement will be
allowed to occur. Although management plans regulate the
quantity of timber extracted, government oversight of this
process is weak and third party certifiers such as the FSC
focus on communities that can demonstrate sustainability,
rather than monitoring activities in communities that do not
meet the high standards required for certification. To
maintain this position of control over timber, a TEO actor
may be uninterested in informing the community about
potential funding opportunities that focus on capacity
building, as occurred in several case study communities.
In addition, the TEO actor is motivated to guard this
lucrative position by attempting to prevent other non-
government actors from entering the community. Inter-
viewees referred to this as ‘territoriality,’ which is often
maintained by TEO actors exploiting paternalistic relation-
ships with communities. As such, TEO actors would prefer
to work in communities with weak internal organization,
representing the vicious cycle in which many communities
are unable to gain the skills required to create Type 3 and 4
forestry programs.
In the case of CDO actors, there is less potential for
mismanagement of forests because these actors are moti-
vated to produce successful communities, rather than to
maximize timber harvests. However, CDO actors’ motiva-
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Type 1 and 2 communities because “NGOs need to have
prestige in order to continue their work” (CDO actor in
Oaxaca). CDO actors may have a strong incentive to secure
well-paying work for their firm and a desire to receive
public praise as a means of advertising their skills and
expertise (Ostrom et al. 2002). Because of this motivation,
CDO actors may prefer to work in communities that
already have successful projects because there is a higher
chance of continued success. This creates an incentive to
promote projects in communities with higher levels of
vertical integration and continue work in these same
communities rather than approach Type 1 or 2 communi-
ties that may have a higher risk of failure and may
therefore not generate the prestige and success necessary
for CDO career advancement. Hence, a virtuous cycle is
created in which successful communities continue to
receive assistance. A similar process was documented in
the Andean highlands, in which demand for poverty
reduction impact led to increased focus on families with
less need but among whom change could be achieved
(Bebbington 2004).
In fact, the availability of communities with strong
internal governance may be a key reason why there are so
many more CDO actors in Oaxaca than in Michoacán. Not
surprisingly, a sharp rise in overall NGO activity has been
documented in Oaxaca, from about 30 NGOs in 1985 to
over 200 in 1999 (Moore et al. 2007). The head of a large
CDO organization in Oaxaca stated that, “Ia mf r o m
Michoacán and I would never have thought of starting an
NGO in Michoacán because there is much more control and
presence of the government in rural issues that tolerates
irregular management of forests.” This pattern has occurred
in the past in Mexico when the Mexico–Germany Partner-
ship, the organization that initiated community forestry in
tropical forests in Mexico in the 1980s, abandoned Chiapas
after two years and reestablished in Quintana Roo because
entrenched interests made it difficult to make progress
(Vargas-Prieto 1998). This geographically uneven NGO
activity is not unique to Mexico and has been documented
at all scales—between continents and countries, within
countries, and between communities—the results of which
can reinforce existing inequalities in development (Mercer
2002; Bebbington 2004).
External non-government actors necessarily operate
within and may have evolved in response to the existing
framework of government regulation. This may help
explain why the existing pool of external actors in each
region varies. Thus, to understand successes and failures of
community-based natural resource management, it is
important to understand not only the activities of external
non-government actors, but also the policy climate within
which they operate.
This analysis provides some clues to explain the two
directions in the growth of community forestry over the
past two decades mentioned in the “Introduction”: stronger
communities continue to develop because they know how
to attract CDO actors, maintain relationships with them,
and receive ongoing assistance from them. More commu-
nities are attaining forestry permits because TEO actors
have an interest in increasing their timber harvests
portfolio; however these communities rarely advance
beyond Type 2 because of a lack of interest in community
development activities.
Path Dependency and Cycles
The motivations of non-government actors not only help
determine which communities receive different types of
assistance; they also create and reinforce institutions in
communities that are either receptive or mistrusting of
external assistance. Because there are few opportunities to
connect to external resources, each encounter with an
external actor solidifies the community’s perception of
external actors. Ostrom (1990) calls this incremental
learning, and additional costs to change institutions,
termed transformation costs, may be incurred as a result
of this learning. In general, trust, reciprocity, and cooper-
ation create feedback loops, and can be seen as complex
adaptive systems in which insignificant circumstances
become magnified. Thus, if interactions with external
actors lead to benefit for the community, future interac-
tions are likely to be sought. For example, in Palo Verde, a
community organizing group call Juventud Campesino
was started by a primary school teacher from outside the
community in 1970s, which some older community
members said contributed to the community’sl a t e r
willingness to look for external support. On the other
hand, in Picachos, after two decades of negative experi-
ences with TEO actors, there is little expectation that
external actors will provide benefits. Thus, once a
relationship is established with an external non-
government actor, the relationship becomes self-
reinforcing, and vicious or virtuous cycles begin to form
which are difficult to undo.
Conclusion
This analysis has uncovered important clues as to why there
has been little progress in creating more Type 3 and 4
communities over the past 15 years and why forest
degradation continues to occur in communities with forest
management permits. As mentioned above, I do not claim
that external actors are the only key to successful
community forestry programs; internal community gover-
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but it is not sufficient.
Unless communities can internalize timber extraction
and community development activities, external non-
government actors will be critical in community forestry,
and therefore must be considered in creating development
strategies. Government sponsored forestry development
programs that do not recognize that external non-
government actors may be uninterested in community
development activities will not create desired outcomes.
Given these conclusions, in designing future programs for
community forestry development, funds should be made
available specifically for promotion and training in Type 1
and 2 communities. These funds should not be tied to
specific communities (to avoid territoriality issues), nor
should future funding be based on the success of projects
(to avoid NGO risk aversion). These projects should be
awarded only to organizations staffed with specialists
trained in community development. In addition, forestry
subsidies for timber extraction activities should only be
granted with the stipulation that community development
trainings are also implemented. Trainings should be given
by trained professionals rather than foresters with no
background in community development. Finally, foresters
must become qualified in community development activi-
ties, potentially through required training programs.
In conclusion, by looking outside the community a new
understanding of commons management can emerge. Not
only are communities embedded in a larger political
economy, they are connected to it through external non-
government actors. These actors have a range of motiva-
tions for engaging with forest communities, and analyzing
these motivations leads to an understanding of why their
impacts on community appropriation of forest management
can lead to different outcomes.
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